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摘  要 
I 







中央中组部 2013 年 10 月 19 日出台了规范性文件，严厉禁止党政机关领导干部
在企业任职兼职的行为，一时间官员独立董事纷纷离职，这才让市场意识到官员
独立董事已成为我国上市公司建立政治关联的一个普遍渠道。 
































Political connection is prevalent all over the world, and in the transition economy 
with a lack of formal institutions, firms are more motivated to establish political 
connection. China is the world's largest transition economy. In the process of reform 
and opening-up, Chinese economy develops rapidly with formal institutions lagging 
behind. The lack of formal institutions leads to the informal institutional arrangements 
-- political connection. To some extent, political connection fills the gaps of formal 
institutions and accelerates the development of Chinese economy. In the meantime, 
firms with political connection also benefit a lot from this kind of informal 
institutional arrangements. Thus, the establishment of a political connection with 
government has become the core competitiveness of firms. In October 19, 2013, the 
Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee issued a normative 
document, strictly prohibited party and government organs and leading cadres from 
holding a job in firms. This document forced a group of politically connected 
independent directors to resign. At that time, the capital market finally realized the 
politically connected independent directors had become a common channel for 
Chinese listed companies to establish a political connection. 
In order to study the cause and effect of politically connected independent 
directors, this paper studies the Chinese listed companies from 2011 to 2013 by using 
the method of empirical study. The research result shows that non-state-owned 
companies are more motivated to hire politically connected independent directors 
when faced with a lower level of property protection and financial development, 
while state-owned companies do not have this motivation. What’s more, both 
non-state-owned companies and state-owned companies will hire politically 
connected independent directors when doing business in regulated industry. Then, this 
paper examines the relationship between politically connected independent directors 
and corporate value by collecting the resigning data of politically connected 
independent directors from October 19, 2013 to December 31, 2015. The research 
result shows that politically connected independent directors will do harm to 
corporate value of non-state-owned companies, while there is no evidence that 















of state-owned companies. 
This paper has several contributions. First, this paper studies the causes and 
results of politically connected independent directors. Second, the paper tries to 
eliminate the endogenous problems in the research of independent directors. Third, 
the paper refines the background of independent directors and enrich the research on 
politically connected independent directors. 
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究得出了不太一致的结论。本文基于中国的制度背景，以 2011 年至 2013 年中国
A 股上市公司为样本，研究了企业通过聘请官员独立董事建立政治关联的动因；































































































































                                                   
①
 据尹筑嘉等 （2015）年的统计，上市公司中一股独大的比例由 2003 年的 76%上升至了 2013 年的 86%，
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